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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

Case No. 981384-CA

vs.
PAM KAY BARRETT and
JEFFERY TODD HUGHES,

Priority [No. 2

Defendants/Appellants.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE

JURISDM I KIN AND N \MHU OF (111 (VISE
Defendants were each convicted of one count of intentional or knowing possession
of methamphetamine, a second-degree felony under Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2) (1998);
four counts of third-degree felony burglary under Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202 (1995) and
two counts of third-degree felony theft under Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (1995); in the
Second Judicial District Court, Honorable Judge Roger S. uutson presiding. This Court
has jurisdiction of the case pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j) (1996).
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ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1.

Was the affidavit supporting the issuance of the warrant to
search the motel room for methamphetamine supported by
probable cause?

"In reviewing the magistrate's finding of probable cause to support a search
warrant based on an affidavit, we will find the warrant invalid only if the magistrate,
given the totality of the circumstances, lacked a "substantial basis" for determining that
probable cause existed

In conducting this review, we will consider the search warrant

affidavit in 'its entirety and in a common-sense fashion' and give 'great deference' to the
magistrate's decision." State v. Thurman., 846 P.2d 1256, 1259 (Utah 1993). See also
State v. BabbelL 770 P.2d 987, 991 (Utah 1989); State v. Hansen. 732 P.2d 127, 129
(Utah 1987). "The affidavit must support the magistrate's decision that there is a 'fair
probability' that evidence of the crime will be found in the place or places named in the
warrant. Thurman, 846 P.2d at 1260 (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238
(1983)).
2.

Was the affidavit to search the motel room for stolen property
supported by probable cause?

For standard of review, see Issue No 1.
3.

Did the trial court properly deny defendants' motion to suppress
self-incriminating statements that defendants claimed were
"fruit of the poisonous tree?"

"We review the trial court's denial of defendant's motion to suppress in a

i
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bifurcated manner, reviewing its subsidiary and factual determinations under a clearly
erroneous standard and reviewing its legal conclusions for correctness." State v. Ribe,
876 P.2d 403,405 (Utah App. 1994); see also State v. Pena. 869 P.2d 932,935-40 (Utah
1994); State v.Thurman. 846 P.2d 1256, 1271 (Utah 1993).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
United State Constitution, Amendment 4.
Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 14.
The foregoing provisions are reproduced in Addendum A.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendants were each charged on March 6, 1998 with one count of intentional or
knowing possession of methamphetamine, a second-degree felony; four counts of thirddegree felony burglary, two counts of third-degree felony theft, one count of class A
misdemeanor theft, and one count of class B misdemeanor theft (R. vol. I at 1, R. vol. II
at 1-8, R. vol. Ill at 1-8, R. vol. IV at 1). Defendants moved to suppress the evidence
obtained pursuant to two search warrants (R. vol. Ill at 27-35). Following a hearing, the
trial court denied the motion (R. vol. Ill at 57-8, R. 51 at 18). On May 5, 1998, the
misdemeanor theft charges were dismissed and defendants pled guilty to the remaining
charges (R. vol. 1 at 18-23, R. vol. II at 46-47, R. vol. Ill at 60-61, R. vol. IV at 19; R. 57
at 3-14). Defendants reserved the right to appeal the trial court's denial of their motion to
suppress (R. 57 at 64).
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On June 23, 1998, the court sentenced defendant Hughes to 1-15 years
imprisonment on the drug charge and 0-5 years on each of the burglary and theft charges,
with sentences to run concurrently (R. vol. I at 31, R. vol. II at 50-51; R. 57 at 73-75).
Defendant Barrett received a 1-15 year prison sentence for the drug charge, and 0-5 year
sentences on each of the burglary and theft charges (R. vol. Ill at 66-9, R. vol. IV at 2425; R. 52 at 63). Barrett's prison sentences were suspended, and she was ordered to
spend one year in jail and followed by three years probation (R. vol. Ill at 66-9, R. vol. IV
at 24-25; R. 52 at 63).
Defendants filed timely notices of appeal (R. vol. I at 39, R. vol. II at 55, R. vol. Ill
at 70, R. vol. IV at 31).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On March 5, 1998, officers executing two warrants to search room 15 of the Circle
R Motel in Roy, Utah, found methamphetamine inside the room belonging to defendant
Hughes (R. vol. II at 11). Defendants showed up at the room and were arrested.
Defendant Barrett was found to be in possession of methamphetamine (R. vol. Ill at 11).
In addition to drugs, the motel room contained property defendants stole from a
neighboring storage facility (R. vol. II at 11, R. vol. Ill at 11).
The Stolen Property Warrant
Prior to the search, a confidential informant alerted police that on March 2, 1998
he had seen defendant Hughes, known to him as MTodd,M bringing boxes of property
4
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across the fence from a Mollerup storage facility to defendant's motel room (R. vol. II at
18; in Affidavit For Search Warrant, Addendum B). Defendant had a pair of bolt cutters
under his coveralls at the time (R. vol. II at 18). The informant told officers that he had
been inside the motel room, and it was full of computer and stereo equipment, electronics
and other property (id.)- I n the room, according to the informant, defendant opened the
boxes he had carried over from Mollerup, and seemed surprised at the contents (id.).
Burglaries of the storage facility were reported the weekend of February 28, 1998 (id-)Based on the above information, officers requested a search warrant (R. vol. II at
16-18, in Addendum B). The warrant and supporting affidavit described the property
sought as:
Home Stereo Equipment, Car Stereo Equipment, Speakers,
Computers, Radar Detectors, Video Games, Boxes of Stored
Goods.
(R. vol. II at 16).
The Return of Search Warrant and Inventory filed by the officer who executed the
warrant ran to two single-spaced pages. It listed dozens of items ranging from stereo
components and Nintendo equipment to stuffed animals, kitchen accessories, and photo
albums, all of which were recovered from the motel room (R. vol. II at 19-20).
The Drug Warrant
The warrant for the stolen property was issued and executed simultaneously with a
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warrant authorizing a search of the motel room for drugs (R. 51 and 57, at 9-101).2
Defense counsel asserted in his Motion to Suppress that the affidavit in support of the
drug warrant stated that within the previous 24 hours, a confidential informant3 had made
an electronically monitored purchase of rnethamphetamine from "David Lefevre" in the
motel room (R. vol. Ill at 28, Appellant's Brief at Addendum 1.5.).4
Officers executing the warrant on the motel room found rnethamphetamine
belonging to defendant Hughes (R. vol. II at 11).
Defendants9 Statements
Following their arrests, defendants made incriminating statements to the officers.
Defendant Hughes admitted that he stole the property found in the motel room from
Mollerup Storage (R. vol. II at 11). He told officers that after stealing the items, he either
put them in his own storage shed, sold them, or moved them into the motel he and Barrett

*R. 51 contains transcripts of the suppression and sentencing hearings, and is
captioned State of Utah vs. Pam K. Barrett. R. 57 contains the same transcripts, but is
captioned State of Utah vs. Jeffery Todd Hughes. The pagination of the two volumes is
identical.
2

The drug warrant and supporting affidavit are not part of the record on appeal.

Apparently, the same informant provided information about the stolen property
(R. vol. II at 17).
4

Although the record does not make clear exactly who David Lefevre was,
defendants later asserted in their Motion to Suppress that David Lefevre was the
registered occupant of the room (R. vol. Ill at 33).
6
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were living in (R. vol II at 30).5 Defendant Barrett admitted that she also stole property
and was present when property was removed from the storage facility (R. vol. Ill at 11).
The Motion to Suppress
Defendants moved to suppress evidence found in the search. First, they asserted
that the affidavit in support of the drug warrant, which alleged a drug buy from David
Lefevre in room 15, did not support probable cause because it did not state
. . . whether or not David Lefevre was the registered guest in
that room, or that he was a registered guest at the time of the
sale, nor does it state who the registered people are in the
room and if the room is still occupied by the same individuals
who occupied it at the time of the sale. Without said
information, the affidavit fails to establish probable cause that
the evidence which the officers were searching for is likely to
be found in the place to be searched.
(R. vol. Ill at 30-31).
Defendants also challenged the issuance of the warrant for stolen property, arguing
that the affidavit "fails to state who the registered guests are in the motel room, and if the
guest [sic] on the 5th of March, 1998, are the same people who occupied the room within
the last 72 hours. Also, the affidavit fails to state what items have been stolen from
Mollerup within the last ten days thereby giving the judge no information to determine

5

A third warrant was issued for the search of the storage shed defendants used to
store additional stolen property (R. vol. II at 28-32). The validity of that warrant was not
challenged in the trial court or on appeal. The Return of Warrant filed in connection with
that warrant listed enough items to fill nearly three single-spaced pages (R. vol. II at 3336).
7
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whether or not the items to be seized were acquired by unlawful conduct" (R. vol. Ill at
31).
Defendants also sought to suppress statements made by defendants subsequent to
their arrests, contending that the statements were "fruit of the poisonous tree" (R. vol. Ill
at 33-34).
At the hearing on the motion to suppress, the trial court denied the motion as to the
drug warrant on the grounds that "the information of the buy within 24 hours at that
location I believe is adequate for the warrant to issue" (R. 51 and 57, at 18). The court
took the remainder of the motion under advisement (R. 51 and 57, at 40; R. vol. II at 42).
Six days later, the court summarily denied the motion by minute entry (R. vol. Ill at 58).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

,

Defendants challenge the validity of the drug warrant on the grounds that it failed
to state David Lefevre's relationship to the motel room or to whom the room was
registered. Since the warrant and affidavit supporting it are not part of the record on
appeal, this Court should presume the regularity of the proceedings below, and affirm the
trial court's denial of the suppression motion. However, if the Court decides to reach the
merits of this issue, it should still affirm because the trial court appropriately found that
the affidavit, which alleged a drug buy in the motel room within the previous 24 hours,
provided sufficient probable cause to support issuance of the warrant.
This Court should also reject defendants' assertion that the affidavit in support of
8
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the warrant for stolen property was deficient because it did not allege with sufficient
particularity the items to be seized. Utah's appellate courts have held that the degree of
particularity required necessarily varies with the circumstances and with the nature of the
property to be seized. The stolen goods were described as specifically as they could have
been under the circumstances. Given the number of items and the varied nature of the
stolen property, the description in the supporting affidavit was sufficiently specific to
support the judge's determination of probable cause.
Alternatively, even if this Court found one of the warrants defective, the seizure of
the evidence should still be affirmed under the plain view exception to the warrant
requirement. So long as one of the warrants was valid, the officers were lawfully on the
premises and could seize clearly incriminating evidence. Only if both warrants are found
defective would suppression be appropriate.
Finally, defendants have failed to support with argument or authority their claim
that the self-incriminating statements defendants made to officers following their arrests
should have been suppressed as Mfruit of the poisonous tree." Since the claim is
inadequately briefed, this Court should decline to consider it. However, even on the
merits, the Court should affirm the trial court's denial of the motion because the warrants
authorizing the searches were valid, and defendants' statements therefore did not
constitute "fruit of the poisonous tree."

9
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ARGUMENT
POINTI
THIS COURT SHOULD AFFIRM DENIAL OF DEFENDANTS'
MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE SEIZED PURSUANT TO
THE DRUG WARRANT BECAUSE (1) THE CHALLENGED
AFFIDAVIT AND WARRANT ARE NOT PART OF THE RECORD
ON APPEAL AND THIS COURT SHOULD PRESUME THE
REGULARITY OF THE PROCEEDINGS BELOW, AND (2) THE
AFFIDAVIT SUPPORTED PROBABLE CAUSE
Defendants challenge the warrant to search the motel room for drugs on the
ground that the supporting affidavit alleged a drug buy from "David Lefevre" but did not
specify "Lefevre's" relationship to the room or who the room's registered occupants
were. Appellant's Brief at 10-12. According to defendants, the failure to so specify
rendered the affidavit "so lacking in indicia of probable cause that the officer cannot rely
in good faith on the Search Warrant." Appellant's Brief at 11.
A.

This Court Should Decline to Reach Defendants' Challenges to the
Affidavit and Warrant to Search for Drugs Because The Affidavit and
Warrant are not Included in the Record on Appeal.
Although part of the affidavit was summarized in defendant's Motion to Suppress

(Appellant's Brief, addendum 1.5), and an apparent copy of the warrant is contained in
addendum no. 3 of defendants' brief, the complete affidavit and warrant are not included
in the record on appeal. Therefore, this Court should decline to consider defendants'
claim, and should affirm the trial court's denial of their motion to suppress.
It has long been the position of Utah's appellate courts that M[w]hen a defendant
10
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predicates error to [an appellate court], he has the duty and responsibility of supporting
such allegation by an adequate record. Absent that record, defendant's assignment of error
stands as a unilateral allegation which the reviewing] court has no power to determine.
[An appellate court] simply cannot rule on a question which depends for its existence
upon alleged facts unsupported by the record.M State v. Longshaw. 961 P.2d 925, 928
(Utah App. 1998), quoting State v. Wulffenstein. 657 P.2d 289, 293 (Utah 1982), cert
denied. 460 U.S. 1044, 75 L. Ed. 2d 799,103 S. Ct. 1443 (1983). "When crucial matters
are not included in the record, the missing portions are presumed to support the action of
the trial court." State v. Theison. 709 P.2d 307, 309 (Utah 1985); see also State v.
Mitchell. 671 P.2d 213, 215 (1983); State v. Tucker. 657 P.2d 755 (1982). Confronted
with an inadequate record on appeal, the appellate court must assume the regularity of the
proceedings below. State v. Miller. 718 P.2d 403, 405 (Utah 1986) (per curiam); see also
State v. Blubaueh. 904 P.2d 688, 699 (Utah App. 1995), cert, denied. 913 P.2d 749 (Utah
1996).
An addendum to an appellant's brief does not substitute for an adequate record.
According to the Utah Supreme Court:
An appellate court's "review is . . . limited to the evidence
contained in the record on appeal." Wilderness Bldg. Sys..
Inc. v. Chapman. 699 P.2d 766. 168 (Utah 1985)...
Therefore, we will not consider evidence which is not part of
the record. Rule 11(e)(2) of the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure requires the appellant to make sure that the record
on appeal includes all of the relevant evidence. Additionally,
11
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although the record may be supplemented if anything material
is omitted, it may not be done by simply including the omitted
material in the party's addendum
Accordingly, we hold
that an appellant's addendum may not consist of evidence that
is outside the record on appeal.
State v. Pliego, no. 970289, slip op. at 2-3 (Utah January 29, 1999) (citation omitted). In
Pliego, the court struck the appellant's addenda containing material outside the record.

M.
Because the affidavit and warrant authorizing search of the motel room for drugs
are not part of the record, this Court should presume that the missing portions of the
record support the trial court's denial of the motion to suppress and should decline to
address defendants' challenge to the validity of the drug warrant.
B.

The Affidavit Supporting the Drug Warrant Provided the Magistrate
With a Substantial Basis to Find the Existence of Probable Cause.
If this Court, despite the fact that the affidavit and warrant are not included in the

record on appeal, chooses to accept defendants' rendition of the contents of the affidavit
and address whether the affidavit supported the magistrate's finding of probable cause, it
should still affirm. Under the highly deferential standard of review applicable to probable
cause determinations, the affidavit provided a substantial basis for the magistrate's
finding of probable cause.
Appellate review of a magistrate's determination that an affidavit supports a
finding of probable cause is confined to an analysis of whether, given the totality of the
i
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circumstances, the magistrate had a "substantial basis" for concluding that a search
would uncover evidence of wrongdoing. Illinois v. Gates. 462 U.S. 213,236 (1983).
"Finely tuned standards such as proof beyond a reasonable doubt or by a preponderance
of the evidence" have no place in the magistrate's decision, and "'only the probability,
and not a prima facie showing, of criminal activity is the standard of probable cause.'"
Id. at 235 (quoting Spinelli v. United States. 393 U.S. 410,419 (1969)); see also State v.
Weaver. 817 P.2d 830, 834 (Utah App. 1991). "[A]fter-the-fact scrutiny by courts of the
sufficiency of an affidavit should not take the form of de novo review. A magistrate's
'determination of probable cause should be paid great deference by reviewing courts.'"
Gates. 462 U.S. at 236 (citations omitted). The "substantial basis" test articulated in
Gates has been adopted and consistently employed by Utah's appellate courts.6
"[RJather than examining each of the omissions enumerated by [defendant], we
look at the affidavit as a whole to determine whether it established a fair probability that a
search would reveal the listed evidence." State v. Blaha. 551 P. 2d 1205,1207 (Utah
1993). Here, the portions of the drug affidavit purportedly described in the motion to
suppress stated that, within the previous 24 hours, the officer-affiant listened in while an
6

See. e,g., State v. Thurman. 846 P.2d 1256, 1260 (Utah 1993); State v. Babbell.
770 P.2d 987, 991 (Utah 1989); State v. Hansen. 732 P.2d 127,129 (Utah 1987); State v.
Anderson. 701 P.2d 1099 (Utah 1985); State v. Brooks. 849 P.2d 640, 643 (Utah App.),
cert, denied. 860 P.2d 943 (Utah App. 1993); State v. Leonard. 825 P.2d 664, 673 (Utah
App. 1992) cert, denied. 843 P.2d 1042 (Utah 1994); State v. Vigh. 871 P.2d 1030,1033
(Utah App. 1994); State v. Collard. 810 P.2d 884, 886 (Utah App.), cert, denied. 817 P.2d
327 (Utah 1991).
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informant purchased methamphetamine from "David Lefevre in room #15" (Appellant's
Brief, addendum 1.5). The magistrate had a substantial basis to conclude that a room
used to sell drugs within the past 24 hours would probably still contain drugs. See Tartv.
Commonwealth. 437 S.E.2d 219, 222-23 (Va. App. 1993) (affidavit containing
informant's report that he had observed crack cocaine in possession of unnamed men in
hotel room within past 72 hours supported probable cause for search of room).
The warrant (as represented in defendants' Addendum No. 3) sought drugs rather
than individuals, and the affidavit's failure to identify who rented the room was not
critical to the object of the search.7 Regardless of who rented the room, the affidavit
indicates clearly that someone had sold drugs in the room, whether present officially as
the registered occupant or intermittently as a guest. On those facts, the precise nature of
"Lefevre's" possessory claims to the room, if any, is not determinative of probable cause.
Therefore, the affidavit provided a substantial basis for the magistrate's determination
that it was probable that methamphetamine would be found in the room.

7

Since a motel room is not a public gathering place, and it may reasonably be
assumed that because only persons close to the registered guest will be expected to be
found there, anyone occupying the room would be involved in or cognizant of the
observed unlawful activity. Cf. State v. Covington. 904 P.2d 209 (Utah App. 1995) ("A
showing that lottery slips are sold in a department store . . . would not justify a warrant to
search every person on the premises, for there would be no probable cause to believe that
everyone there was participating in the illegal operation. On the other hand, a showing
that a dice game is operated in a manhole or in a bam should suffice, for the reason that
the place is so limited and the illegal operation so overt that it is likely that everyone
present is a party to the offense.")
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G.

Even if the Drug Warrant had been Invalid, the Officers were Legally
on the Premises Pursuant to the Stolen Property Warrant and the
Drugs Were Lawfully Seized Under the Plain View Exception to the
Warrant Requirement,
If this Court decides that the drug warrant was invalid, the Court should still affirm

the trial court's refusal to suppress the drugs under the plain view exception to the
warrant requirement. So long as the officers were lawfully present in the motel room to
search for stolen property, they were authorized to seize the drugs.
M

The requirements for application of [the plain view] doctrine are satisfied if: (1)

the officer is lawfully present where the search and seizure occur; (2) the evidence seized
is in plain view; and (3) the evidence seized is clearly incriminating." State v. Nield, 804
P.2d 537, 538 (Utah App. 1990). In this case, the first element of the plain view
exception is satisfied because the officers were lawfully present in the room pursuant to
the valid warrant to search for stolen property. See discussion, Point II, infra at 21-23.
The second element was satisfied because the drugs were within the plain view of officers
legitimately searching the motel room.8 Finally, at least one of the officers was trained
and experienced in drug investigations (R. vol. HI at 28; Appellant's Brief at Addendum
8

The stolen property warrant sought, among other items, video games and stereo
equipment. Since video games are small, and stereo equipment can include small
components, the officers would have been justified in searching every part of the room
and its contents. State v. Hansen. 732 P.2d 127,131 (Utah 1987) (MA lawful search of
fixed premises generally extends to the entire area in which the contraband could
reasonably be found and is not limited by the possibility that separate acts of entry or
opening may be required to complete the search"). Therefore, the drugs were in plain
view.
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1.5). Therefore, the drugs were recognizable to the officers as contraband, and were
therefore clearly incriminating.
The elements of the plain view exception were satisfied, and the trial court's denial
of defendants' motion to suppress should therefore be affirmed.
D*

Defendants' Claim that Officers "Were Reckless in the Affidavit"
Lacks Merit Because the Facts About Which the Officers
Were Allegedly Reckless Would Not Have Altered the
Magistrate's Probable Cause Determination .
Defendants apparently acknowledge that under United States v. Leon, 468 U.S.

897 (1984), exclusion of evidence is not required where officers reasonably rely in good
faith on a warrant issued by a detached and neutral magistrate, even if the warrant is
subsequently found deficient. Appellant's Brief at 11. However, defendants claim that
the omission of certain information negated the officers' good-faith reliance on the search
warrant. Id. Specifically, defendants claim that
Even though officers knew the room was registered to David Lefevre, they
were reckless in the affidavit by failing to state that there was no indication
that David Lefevre was actually residing in the motel room at the time of
the alleged drug transaction
[Tjhey made no further inquiry as to
whether or not Mr. Lefevre was still the registered guest in the room or if
the Defendants were, in fact, the registered guests in the room. The officers
also failed to inform the court whether the alleged drug transaction was set
up through [defendant Hughes] or Mr. Lefevre.
Appellant's Brief at 12-13.
Defendants'claims fail because the exact identities of the room's registered
occupants or the person setting up the drug transaction would not have materially affected
16
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<

the determination of probable cause.9 When a defendant challenges the validity of a
warrant on the ground that material information has been omitted from the supporting
affidavit, the defendant "must establish by a preponderance of the evidence that material
information has been intentionally, knowingly or recklessly omitted, and that with the
omitted information inserted, the affidavit does not support probable cause." State v.
Lee, 863 P.2d 49, 55 (Utah App. 1993).
Here, defendants have failed to make the required threshold evidentiary showing
that material information was "intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly" omitted.
However, even if they had made such a showing, inclusion in the affidavit of the
information defendants claim was omitted would not have altered the magistrate's
determination of probable cause. In fact, inclusion of the fact that the room was
registered to "Lefevre" at all relevant times could only have strengthened, rather than
negated, the basis for the magistrate's finding of probable cause. "Lefevre" was
identified in the affidavit as the drug seller, and if the room was still registered to him, the
magistrate could have concluded that it was even more likely that the contraband would
still be in the room.
Finally, the record does not show that officers knew who set up the drug
transaction. But even if they had known, inclusion of the identity of the person setting up

9

Besides, as the Court is aware, it is not uncommon for persons to rent motel
rooms or engage in illegal activities under assumed names.
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the drug transaction, absent any evidence that the occupants of the room had changed,
would not have diminished the likelihood that methamphetamine would be found in the
room within 24 hours after a drug buy. Under the totality of the circumstances presented
to him, the magistrate was justified in assuming that the room's occupants had not
changed, and that the drugs were still present.
E.

Defendants' Challenges to Overbreadth and Vagueness of the Drug
Paraphernalia Statute and to the Warrant's Reference to
,y
Methamphetamine Pipes and Drug Paraphernalia" are Baseless.
Defendants claim that the definition section of Utah's drug paraphernalia statute,

Utah Code Ann. § 58-37a-3 (1998), is overly broad and vague because "almost anything
could be classified as 'drug paraphernalia.'"Appellant's Brief at 15-16. Further,
defendants challenge the drug warrant on the ground that it sought "methamphetamine
pipes and drug paraphernalia," and those terms are overbroad and vague. Defendants
claim that "methamphetamine pipes" are not defined in or specifically prohibited by the
drug paraphernalia statute. Appellant's Brief at 16.
Failure to Preserve. Defendants' claims were not preserved below. It is well
settled that a claim of error must be presented to the trial court in a timely and specific
manner in order to preserve an issue for appeal. State v. Winward, 941 P.2d 627, 633
(Utah App. 1997); State v. Beltran-Felix. 922 P.2d 30, 33 (Utah App. 1996). Inasmuch as
defendants failed to preserve their challenge, they have waived those issues and this Court
should decline to address them on appeal.
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Inadequate Briefing. Since defendants have failed to support their claims with
argument, authority, or citations to the record, their claims are inadequately briefed.
Under rule 24(a)(9), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, a party to an appeal must
provide an argument containing the "contentions and reasons of the [party] with respect to
the issues presented, including the grounds for reviewing any issue not preserved in the
trial court, with citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied on."
Utah's appellate courts have ruled that when a party fails to comply with this rule, the
court will decline to address the issue because Ma reviewing court is entitled to have the
issues clearly defined with pertinent authority cited and is not simply a depository in
which the appealing party may dump the burden of argument and research." State v.
Bishop. 753 P.2d 439, 450 (Utah 1988), quoting Williamson v. OpsahL 416 N.E.2d 783,
784 (1981): see also Burns v. Summerhavs. 927 P.2d 197, 199 (Utah App. 1996). "Utah
courts routinely decline to consider inadequately briefed arguments." State v. Bryant.
965 P.2d 539, 549 (Utah App. 1998): see also State v. Wareham. 772 P.2d 960, 966 (Utah
1989) (declining to address argument on the ground that defendant's brief "wholly lacks
legal analysis and authority to support his argument").
Mootness. "A case is moot when the requested relief cannot affect the rights of
the litigants." Osguthorpe v. Osguthorpe. 872 P.2d 1057, 1058 (Utah App.) cert, denied.
883 P.2d 1359 (Utah 1994). This Court ordinarily will not consider mooted questions on
appeal. Osguthorpe. 872 P.2d at 1058.
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Even if defendants' claims had been adequately preserved and briefed, their claims
are moot because there is no indication in the record that any drug paraphernalia were
seized. Since no drug paraphernalia were seized, there was no evidence in the form of
drug paraphernalia to suppress, and the issue is moot. See Saunders v. Sharp. 818 P.2d
574, 577 (Utah App. 1991). Furthermore, defendants were neither charged nor convicted
of drug paraphernalia offenses. Therefore, even if this Court were to rule that the drug
paraphernalia statute is overbroad or vague, the court's holding would not affect
defendants'convictions, which were for burglary, theft, and possession of
methamphetamine.
Additionally, assuming the purported copy of the warrant appended to defendants'
brief is accurate, the warrant does not specify either "methamphetamine pipes" or "drug
paraphernalia." Instead, it lists
•
•

•
•

Materials for packaging methamphetamine,
specifically small plastic baggies.
Materials for using methamphetamine, including
hollow tubes for snorting methamphetamine, small
spoons for snorting methamphetamine, mirrors for
holding methamphetamine while being snorted, razor
blades for cutting methamphetamine into lines.
Scales for weighing methamphetamine.
Cut, substance used to dilute the methamphetamine.

Appellant's Brief at addendum 3. Since neither of the terms "methamphetamine pipes" or
"drug paraphernalia" were used, the terms' overbreadth or vagueness cannot be an issue
in this case.
<
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POINT II
THE STOLEN PROPERTY WARRANT WAS
SUPPORTED BY PROBABLE CAUSE
Defendants argue that the warrant to search room 15 for stolen property was
deficient because it failed to state whether the property to be seized was evidence of a
crime, who the registered occupants of the room were,10 or what items were stolen from
the storage facility. Appellant's Brief at 10-11. In addition, defendants assert that the
warrant was merely a"general warrant1' because it did not state with particularity the
items to be seized. Appellant's Brief at 14-15.
Contrary to defendants claims, the affidavit supporting the search warrant for
stolen property clearly stated that the property sought was "unlawfully acquired,"
"unlawfully possessed," or "evidence of illegal conduct" (R. vol. II at 17). The informant
saw defendant Hughes carrying boxes of property across the fence from the storage
facility to the motel, then opening the boxes and reacting with surprise to the contents (R.
vol. II at 18). The informant stated that "[defendant's] room was full of computer
equipment, stereo equipment, electronics, and other property." The affidavit further
relates that burglaries of the storage facility were reported five days previously. It is
obvious from the informant's description of the events and circumstances that the

10

Defendants' claims regarding the lack of information as to whom the room was
rented lack merit because, inasmuch as the warrant was directed at property rather than
persons, inclusion of the information that the room was rented to David Lefevre would
not have negated the determination of probable cause. See discussion supra at 16-17.
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property was stolen and was therefore evidence of a crime.
A.

The Warrant To Search For Stolen Property was Sufficiently Specific
Under the Totality of the Circumstances.
The requirement of particularity means that a warrant "must be sufficiently

particular to guide the officer to the thing intended to be seized, thereby minimizing the
danger of unwanted invasions of privacy. Accordingly, the line between what is and what
is not sufficiently particular must be drawn with a view to accomplishment of the
constitutional purpose, and necessarily varies with the circumstances and with the nature
of the property to be seized.'1 State v. Gallegos. 712 P.2d 207, 209 (Utah 1985).
Although warrants describing property only in generic terms are not favored by the law,
,f

use of such descriptions has been allowed when a more specific description of the things

to be seized is unavailable/1 Id. General descriptions are sufficient in cases where ,,;a
detailed description has been difficult and the evidence established that the stolen goods
are likely to be part of a larger collection of similar contraband located at the premises to
<

be searched.'" Id. at 209-210. quoting Namen v. State, 665 P.2d 557, 561-61 (Alaska
App. 1983): see also State v. Nield. 804 P.2d 537. 539 (Utah App. 1990) (general
description in warrant may be sufficient where more detailed inventory of stolen property

4

unavailable).
The descriptions of the stolen property in this case were sufficiently particular
under Gallegos because the affidavit makes clear that a large number of stolen items were
located at the premises. The affidavit and warrant were directed to the recovery of
«
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"Home Stereo Equipment, Car Stereo Equipment, Speakers, Computers, Radar Detectors,
Video Games, [and] Boxes of Stored Goods" (R. vol. II at 18). Having been taken from a
storage facility, the boxes of stored goods could reasonably be expected to contain a
variety of miscellaneous items, and, from the context of the affidavit, the informant was
obviously not in a position to compile a comprehensive inventory of the goods. Those
facts contributed to a totality of circumstances making the creation of a detailed list of
stolen items impossible. See Illinois v. Rende. 624 N.E.2d 922, 927 (111. App. 1993)
(broad description permissible where there was probable cause to believe that a large
number of stolen goods present, a more precise description could not reasonably have
been expected, and there is a high likelihood that the items seized were unlawfully
present). Furthermore, the place to be searched was a motel room, not a private
residence. The objects of the search-stereos, radar detectors, boxes of household
property, etc.-would clearly stand out from the furnishings, luggage, clothing, and
personal effects normally found in a motel room.
B.

The Seizure of Stolen Property was Lawful under the Plain View
Exception to the Warrant Requirement
Although the State does not concede that the affidavit to search for stolen property

was insufficiently particular, even if it had been, the evidence was lawfully seized
pursuant to the plain view exception to the warrant requirement. So long as the Court
determines that the drug warrant was valid, the officers were lawfully on the premises and
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could seize plainly incriminating evidence.ll
"The requirements for application of [the plain view] doctrine are satisfied if: (1)
the officer is lawfully present where the search and seizure occur; (2) the evidence seized
is in plain view; and (3) the evidence seized is clearly incriminating." State v. Nield, 804
P.2d 537, 538 (Utah App. 1990). Here, the first element of the plain view exception is
satisfied because the officer was lawfully present in the room pursuant to the warrant to
search for drugs. The second element was satisfied because the items seized were within
the plain view of officers legitimately searching the motel room for drugs. Finally, under
the third element, the stolen property was clearly incriminating. The officers executing
the warrants were the same officers whofiledthe supporting affidavits, and were well
aware that the room was being used to store large quantities of stolen property (R. vol. II
at 11,18, 21; R. vol. Ill at 11, 28). The stolen property - comprising dozens of items obviously stood out from the furnishings and personal effects normally found in a motel
room. See Return of Warrant, R. vol. II at 19-20. The stolen property was therefore

1

Alternatively, if the court determines that the stolen property warrant was
sufficiently particular as to some, rather than all, of the described stolen property, the
officers were lawfully present with regard to the valid portions of the stolen property
warrant. See State v. Nield, 804 P. 2d 537, 538-39 (Utah App. 1990); see also Ashcraft v.
Texas, 934 S.W. 2d, 727, 734 (Tex. App. 1996) ("a defect in the warrant does not render
the warrant invalid as a whole
The invalid portion of the warrant can be severed from
the valid portion."). While the State contends that the stolen property warrant was
sufficiently particular as to all property described therein, to the extent that "boxes of
stolen property" might be regarded as a less specific description than, for example, "home
stereo equipment," that portion of the warrant is severable.
24
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clearly incriminating.
Since the elements of the plain view exception are clearly met, the seizure of
stolen property should be upheld.
POINT III
DEFENDANTS' CLAIM THAT THEIR CONFESSIONS WERE
"FRUIT OF THE POISONOUS TREE" IS INADEQUATELY
BRIEFED AND WITHOUT MERIT
The last sentence of defendants' brief contains the clause "... and the statements
obtained from the defendant were 'fruits of the poisonous tree,9 and all evidence obtained
from the searches and the statements of the Defendants must be suppressed." Appellant's
Brief at 17.
In order to prevail on their claim that defendants' confessions were "fruit of the
poisonous tree" and should be suppressed, defendants must show that the confessions
flowed from illegal conduct on the officers' part. However, as noted in Points I and II, so
long as even one warrant was valid, the officers were lawfully on the premises. Supra at
15-16, 23-25. Defendant must therefore show that both warrants were invalid.
Defendants cannot even begin to meet this burden, and, indeed, they have not attempted
to do so.
Inadequate Briefing. Defendants' entire argument on this point consists of the
21 words quoted above, unsupported by discussion, authority or citations to the record.
Additionally, defendants have failed to even identify which statements they challenge.
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Consequently, the claim is inadequately briefed, and this Court should decline to consider
it on appeal. See discussion of inadequate briefing, supra at 18-19. The record
demonstrates that after defendants were advised of their Miranda rights, they admitted to
officers that they stole the property found in the motel room (R. vol. II at 30; vol. Ill at
11). Because defendants have failed to explain how their confessions amount to "fruit of
the poisonous tree," the State cannot be expected to respond in any meaningful way.
Indeed, for the State to respond at all, it would be forced to construct defendants'
arguments for them. Neither rule 24(a)(9), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure-which
requires the parties on appeal to support their claims with an argument and citations to
authorities, statutes, and the record-nor case law authorizes such a shifting of defendants'
burden.
No "Poisonous Tree." If the Court decides to address the claim notwithstanding
defendants' failure to brief it, it should affirm the trial court's denial of the motion to
suppress the statements. The officers were lawfully present in the motel room conducting
a valid searches, and defendants' admissions should therefore not be suppressed.

Cf.

State v. Yoder. 935 P.2d 534, 544 n.7 (Utah App. 1997) (defendant's inculpatory
statements to police admissible because the search leading to his arrest was supported by
probable cause, and the statements were therefore not "fruit of the poisonous tree.");
State v. Lee. 633 P.2d 48, 52 (Utahl981) ("Since the search was not unconstitutional, the

i
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subsequent seizure could not be 'fruit of the poisonous tree/ and therefore suppressive.11)
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, the State respectfully requests that this Court affirm
defendants' convictions.
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AMENDMENTS TO THE
CONSTITUTION OF
THE UNITED
STATES

AMENDMENT IV
[Unreasonable searches and seizures.]
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons
or things to be seized.

CONSTITUTION OF UTAH
ARTICLE I
DECLARATION OF
RIGHTS

Sec. 14. [Unreasonable searches forbidden — Issuance of
warrant.]
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated; and
no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, particularly describing the place to be searched, and the person or thing
to be seized.
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